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T
he bombings in London last year
cast their shadow over the whole
country, with repercussions around
the world. The true impact on victims
and rescuers, as well as their loved ones
and friends, will never be really known.
The scars may fade but are unlikely to
vanish.
At the time, the impression was that
the response of all emergency services
was wonderful; apart from anything
else it showed to the world that Britain
was well on the way to being ready to
host the Olympic Games in 2012,
following the announcement of the
successful bid the previous day. The
London Assembly, in a preliminary 151
page report released in June, begs to
differ.1
The Assembly comprises 25 members,
elected at the same time as the Mayor of
London. Fourteen constituencies each
have a member; a further 11 members
are elected from party lists to ensure
that the numbers from each party are
proportional to the votes cast for that
party across the whole of London. The
Assembly members thus have a man-
date to represent the views of
Londoners; they are powerful and influ-
ential.
The Assembly has nothing but the
highest of praise for individuals, the
unsung heroes, both amateur and pro-
fessional, who responded on that night-
mare of a day. It was London ‘‘at its
humane best’’. Its criticisms are left for
the systemic aspects of the response.
The Assembly reports on organisa-
tional failings, poor communication
between different emergency services,
and their failure to plan together and in
a coordinated way. Emergency services
were focused inwards and not out-
wards, concerned primarily with their
own point of view. There was a stronger
focus on incidents and processes rather
than individuals and people. A remark-
able figure is quoted: more than 75% of
the 4000 people affected by the bomb-
ings are still unknown to the authori-
ties. Communication underground on
the day was substandard. The London
Ambulance Service had a lack of capa-
city to deliver equipment and medical
supplies to the scene of a major incident
at multiple sites. There was a lack of
basic equipment, such as stretchers,
triage cards, and fluids. There was also
a general failure to maintain good
records of the emergency services’
response to the bombings. There are 54
recommendations with no finger point-
ing. The Assembly plans a follow up
report in November of this year.
It is hard for those of us not directly
affected to know what the murdered
victims’ relatives and friends, the survi-
vors, or rescuers will be thinking as they
reflect on the media coverage of this
report. Who knows what questions they
now have. Have any of their pre-existing
questions been answered? Do they now
have new questions? Is their grief
compounded or assuaged? Do the res-
cuers feel let down by their masters and
mistresses? Do the rescuers feel that
their careful attention to learning about
disaster planning, their attendance at
MIMS courses or similar, and their
dedication and preparedness to respond
have been undermined?
The fragmentation in planning, with
each agency thinking inwards rather
than outwards, with each agency declar-
ing a major incident individually rather
than collectively, is where the real
lesson lies. Is it symptomatic of some-
thing far bigger and deeper? What is the
lesson for the NHS?
The NHS is being broken up. The
establishment of PFI hospitals, founda-
tion trusts, independent treatment cen-
tres, and the contracting models of
primary care provision, with private
investment in the latter, ultimately
means that the key concern of all these
organisations will be to their share-
holders. These are developments that
do not leave us with confidence that
true coordination of regional and
national planning will be at the top of
any agenda in the new and reconfigured
NHS. It will be every man and woman
for him and herself.
By planning we do not just mean
emergency and disaster planning, we
also mean the planning and coordina-
tion of most facets of health care
delivery and its infrastructure, from
public health and acute care, right
through to long term care of the elderly
and the chronically sick. PFI hospitals,
foundation trusts, and the like will have
a mentality similar to that of the
emergency services who responded on
7 July: inward rather than outward
thinking, and individualism over collec-
tive responsibility will be the norm.
There will be too many cooks in the
kitchen spoiling the broth.
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